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HONDURAS:
A DEMOCRACY GONE AWRY
THE FORCEFUL OUSTER OF A PRESIDENT
Alexander S. Farr
I. OVERVIEWTHE scene: the White House, in the dead of night; 200 military
soldiers rush up the front lawn to the entrance, break down the
door, disable the secret service, drag President Obama out of bed
into a waiting vehicle, rush him off to the nearest airbase, and dump him
unceremoniously on a plane to Mexico. While some U.S. citizens might
rejoice at such events, not one could claim them to be democratic exer-
cises of due process-not even if the Supreme Court had authorized it.
But this is effectively the exact fate that befell President Manuel Zelaya
of the Honduras on June 28, 2009, when he was dragged out of bed and
jetted off to Costa Rica.'
The military removal of Mr. Zelaya was the first coup in Latin America
since the Cold War 2 and drew much international attention and media
coverage as a result. Mr. Zelaya instigated the drastic reaction when he
called for an referendum (traditionally a power left solely to the Hondu-
ran Congress under the country's constitution3 ) to include a consultative
poll question on the November 2009 election ballots as to whether the
Honduran people wanted to call a constituent assembly.4 Mr. Zelaya's
political opponents feared he was imitating Venezuela's Hugo Chavez by
calling for a constitutional reform that would allow him to run for an-
other term in office,5 a result strictly prohibited by the current Honduran
constitution. 6 Mr. Zelaya's actions alienated him from the Congress, mil-
1. Editorial, Booted Out: A Coup in Honduras Brings an Unwelcome old Habit Back
to Latin America, EcONoMIsT, June 29, 2009, available at http://www.economist.
com/world/americas/PrinterFriendly.cfm?story-id=13936693.
2. Editorial, Honduras Coup: Fidel Castro Says it Was 'a Suicidal Error', DAILY TEL-
EGRAPH, June 29, 2009, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/
centralamericaandthecaribbean/honduras/5683705/Honduras-coup-Fidel-Castro-
says-it-was-a-suicidal-error.html.
3. Editorial, Defying the Outside World, ECONoMIsT, July 2, 2009, available at http://
www.economist.com/world/americas/PrinterFriendly.cfm?story-id=13952942.
4. Booted Out, supra note 1.
5. Id.
6. See CONsTIrucIoN DE LA REPUBLICA DE HONDURAS 1982 art. 239, available at
http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Honduras/hond82.html.
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itary, and Supreme Court,7 especially after he attempted to remove the
head of the armed forces, Romeo V~squez Velizquez, for refusing to
comply with his orders to distribute the contested ballot papers.8 Mr.
Zelaya took matters into his own hands by leading a group of supporters
to collect the confiscated ballot papers and distribute them himself;9 this
was effectively the last straw for his opposition within the government.
After the coup, the Honduran government installed Mr. Roberto
Micheletti, head of the Honduran Congress, as the interim president
under a "lawful 'constitutional succession."" 0 During his brief time in
office:
[N]o country . . .recognized the de facto government of Mr.
Micheletti. President Obama and other leaders in the hemi-
sphere. .. .insisted that Mr. Zelaya be returned to office, contending
that he was removed in a coup. The United States, the European
Union, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank... .all
suspended aid to Honduras in protest."
Despite international condemnation, Mr. Micheletti refused to sign the
San Jose Accord, a treaty that would have permitted Mr. Zelaya to return
to the presidency to serve out the remainder of his term until the Novem-
ber 2009 elections' 2 and called Mr. Zelaya's removal a legal act.' 3 But
the Honduran government suffered economically for its refusal to negoti-
ate: the United States suspended $30 million in direct aid to Honduras,' 4
the Organization of American States (OAS) expelled Honduras and sus-
pended aid,15 and the UN condemned the coup.'6 Furthermore, "without
OAS membership, Honduras faces trade sanctions and the loss of hun-
dreds of millions of dollars in subsidized oil, aid and loans."' 7 Mr.
Micheletti remained steadfast throughout his few months as acting presi-
7. Kim Ghattas, U.S. Treads Careful Path on Honduras, BBC NEWS, June 30, 2009,
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/americas/8127772.stm.
8. Booted Out, supra note 1.
9. Id.
10. Editorial, Honduras Court Shuns Zelaya Deal, BBC NEWS, Aug. 23, 2009, available
tit http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/americas/8217393.stm.
11. Elisabeth Malkin, Ousted Leader Returns to Honduras, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22. 20t09,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/22/world/americas/22honduras.html?
-r=1&emc=etal.
12. Marc Lacey, New Plan to End Honduran Standoff Resembles Failed Ones of Past,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/28/world/
americas/28honduras.htmi.
13. Malkin, supra note 11.
14. Ginger Thompson, U.S. Suspends $30 Million to Honduras, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4,
2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/04/world/americas/04honduras.
html?_r=l.
15. Editorial, Time on Whose Side?, ECONOMISTr, July 30, 2009, available at http://
www.economist.com/world/americas/PrinterFriendly.cfm?story-id=14140333.
16. Ohattas, supra note 7.
17. Armando Doronila, Coup Comeback, PHILIP'PINE DAILY INQUIRER, July 8, 2009,
available at http://opinion.inquirer.net/inquireropinion/columnsview/20090708-
214399/Coup-come back.
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dent, until the inauguration of Porfirio Lobo in early 2010.18 When Mr.
Zelaya attempted to return to the Honduran capital of Tegucigalpa by
taking refuge in the Brazilian Embassy on September 22nd, Mr.
Micheletti said that, "A court is ready to proceed against him legally, and
a jail is also ready."l 9
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND DEMOCRATIC ISSUES
IN HONDURAS
While a number of constitutional rewrites have recently passed in other
Latin American nations, this is the first situation to result in a forcible
removal of the executive. 20 The constitutionality of Mr. Zelaya's actions
depends on whether he was actually advancing a referendum or merely
conducting "a non-binding survey" as one state department official put
it.21 Only the Honduran Congress has the power to approve a national
referendum calling for a constituent assembly to rewrite the constitu-
tion.22 The Honduran Congress and Supreme Court clearly interpreted
Mr. Zelaya's actions as those of a prohibited nature because the Attorney
General filed criminal charges that the Supreme Court then certified.23
Supreme Court Justice Rosalinda Cruz said the removal was not a coup
because the military was acting under court orders that were the result of
a unanimous decision by the fifteen justices on the court.24 The court's
official statement was that"[T]he armed forces, in charge of supporting
the constitution, acted to defend the state of law and have been forced to
apply legal dispositions against those who have expressed themselves
publicly and acted against the dispositions of the basic law." 25
Even if Mr. Zelaya's arrest was legal, many constitutional lawyers have
since argued that "the army violated the rule of law by flying him out of
the country, instead of allowing him a fair trial in Honduras." 26 But Jus-
tice Cruz said the military's decision to send Mr. Zelaya out of the coun-
try was a safety measure to prevent the spread of violence and riots that
18. Jos6 Manuel Zelaya, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/times-
topics/people/z/jose.manuel-zelayalindex.htmi (last visited Mar. 16, 2010).
19. Malkin, supra note 11.
20. Editorial, Latin America: Coups and Constitutions, BBC NEWS, June 30, 2009,
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hilamericas/8126351.stm.
21. Ghattas, supra note 7.
22. Mary Anastasia O'Grady, Honduras Defends Its Democracy, WALL STr. J., June 29,
2009, at All, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124623220955866301.
html.
23. Frances Robles, Coup in Honduras: In Honduran Debate over Coup, Lines Be-
tween Rich and Poor Never So Stark, MIAMI HERALD, July 5, 2009, at Al.
24. Joshua Goodman & Blake Schmidt, Honduras Supreme Court Judge Defends Pres-
ident Ouster, BLOOMBERG, July 1, 2009, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/
apps/newspid=20601086&sid=axGENUiy9yKs#.
25. Jeremy McDermott, Honduras Supreme Court'Ordered Army Coup', DAILY TEL-
EGRAPH, Jun. 28, 2009, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/
centralamericaandthecaribbean/honduras/5677026/Honduras-supreme-court-
ordered-army-coup.html.
26. Andres Oppenheimer, Partisan Split on Honduras Can be Costly, BRADENTON
HERALD, July 25, 2009.
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would result had he been detained for trial.27
The Honduran government found itself in a predicament in the months
following Mr. Zelaya's ousting: if it allowed him to return, it would essen-
tially signal "approval of his unconstitutional acts; [but] if he [was] not
allowed to return, then [it would approve] the unacceptable behavior of
forcibly exiling a leader."128 Rafael Lopez, an advisor for the Interna-
tional Foundation for Electoral Systems, condemned the latter message
asserting that, "'No country on earth' can legally force an elected official
into exile without a formal proceeding."129 Furthermore, Jorge Heine of
the Balsillie School of International Affairs perceived the situation as
posing a greater systematic threat to the region, stating:
[T]he true significance of the coup, in one of the poorest and weakest
countries in the hemisphere . .. lies in the test it poses to the inter-
American system False If the latter cannot succeed in restoring de-
mocracy in Honduras, it cannot do so anywhere. The message would
thus be crystal clear: coup-makers can act with impunity.30
Hence, allowing the coup to stand without recourse could propagate
similar fates in weaker democratic progressive governments of the
region.31
III. DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA
A. GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND ISSUES
In assessing the relative democratic principles and constitutional provi-
sions behind the Honduran removal of former-President Zelaya, it would
be inappropriate to look for a comparison with the ''model democracy"
of the United States. This is because Honduras and other Latin Ameri-
can nations have a drastically different history and socio-economic envi-
ronment, which has led to the evolution of a democratic system targeted
at mollifying specific regional issues and advancing principles favorable to
members of that society. Furthermore:
[d]emocracy is not an all-or-nothing proposition. ... [it ranges] from
purely faqade democracies. . .to formal or procedural democra-
cies. ... [to] substantive democracies, where you find not merely forms
and procedures but also rights, a free press, effective legislative and
judicial institutions, military subordination to legitimate, elected ci-
vilian authority... .all the things, in short, that serve as a check on the
abuse of power and give meaning to the concept of popular sover-
27. Goodman & Schmidt, supra note 24.
28. Mel Martinez, Latin America: Foundations of Democracy Being Dismantled,
MIAMI HERALD, July 13, 2009.
29. Goodman & Schmidt, supra note 24.
30. Olivia Ward, Raising the Stakes in Honduras, TORONTO STAR, Sept. 6, 2009, availa-
ble at http://www.torontoforumoncuba.tyo.ca/?p=3754.
31. Seumas Milne, Dangers in U.S. Ambivalence to Ditched Honduran Democracy,
IRISH TIMES, Aug. 14, 2009, available at http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/
opinion/2009/0814/1224252546730.html.
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eignty or self government. 32
But Latin American democracies are facing a crisis because "[j]udicial
systems are often weak [or] corrupt and citizen security is deteriorating in
many nations."133 This is a serious issue because:
[iun order to prevent governmental abuse and arbitrary action and
make the legal system more predictable, nations implementing re-
forms require a judicial institution that is strong, independent, ethi-
cal, and effective. To achieve this goal, there is a need for a judiciary
that can balance the power of the political branches while avoiding
arbitrariness and tyranny.34
The Inter-American Democratic Charter, advanced by the OAS as a
response to democratic threats, established a framework for guiding de-
mocracies to protect the right of citizens to live in a functioning demo-
cratic system based on the rule of law.35 The rule of law is "a legal fiction
framing a set of norms, values, and legal traditions defining a code of
conduct and boundaries necessary for the maintenance of a civil society
and responsive government."136 The rule of law includes an application of
formal or procedural justice, which requires the application of fair, con-
sistent, and predictable rules by the legal system.37
Looking at democracy from a procedural perspective, it is clear that
some of the key conditions of an effective procedural democracy are an
"adherence to constitutional rules" and "structures that ensure that the
executive [(president)] can be held to account for decisions he or she has
made."138 But a strong independent judiciary is a critical component for
upholding such policies, and unfortunately "many of Latin America's ju-
dicial systems are neither independent nor effective, often fail to ensure
citizens enjoy their constitutional rights and suffer from political interfer-
ence and corruption."139 While a strong judiciary is essential for checking
the executive and legislative branches, the inflexibility of legal codes in
Latin America results in "rulings. .. .resistant to compromise as courts and
judges apply the law rather than interpret it."14 0
B. THE ISSUE OF MILITARY COUPS IN LATIN AMERICA
Historically, Latin America has experienced more than its fair share of
military coups. In many instances, military generals would simply topple
32. Donald E. Schulz, The Growing Threat to Democracy in Latin America, 31 PA-
RAMETERS 1, June 30, 2001, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-mO
IB R/is_1_31 /ai_73000542/?tag=content;col1.
33. LATIN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: EMERGING REALITY OR ENDANGERED SPECIES?
2 (Richard L. Millet et al. eds., 2009).
34. Id. at 91.
35. Id. at 80.
36. Id. at 85.
37. Id. at 86.
38. GAVIN (J'ToOLE, POLITICS IN LATIN AMERICA 104-105 (2007).
39. Id. at 136.
40. Id. at 189.
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the legally elected president to prevent policies they did not like and
would run the politics of the nation based on what was most favorable to
the military.4'I Latin American militaries would often serve "as 'guaran-
tors' of the institutional order, and. . .often employed constitutional argu-
ments to legitimize non-democratic forms of government."14 2 While pure
military coups have fallen off in recent years, the legislature may still en-
list the help of the military to achieve its ends in a manner that is ques-
tionable from a democratic perspective. Such legislative coups usually
involve two components: "dubious congressional procedures and active
military participation-even military initiative False"14 3 While the OAS
amended its charter to suspend member countries for overthrowing dem-
ocratic governments by force in an effort to protect fledgling democra-
cies' 44 it is clear such policies have had little impact on the actions in
Honduras.
C. THE ISSUE OF CONTINUISMO IN LATIN AMERICA
Latin American political history is rife with the recurrent theme of
"Icontinuismo" in which presidents nearing the end of their term in office
amend or "reinterpret" the constitution of their country to allow them-
selves to run for additional terms-many times resulting in the emer-
gence of an authoritarian regime .4 5 This is an issue for many Latin
American democracies, because it "gives the impression that constitu-
tions are being manipulated so that certain presidents can stay in power
indefinite ly."146 Presidents who engage in tactics to extend their tenure
are known as "caudillos" or "strongmen" due to their authoritarian posi-
tion' 4 7 and even many "popular. .. .presidents. . .have. .. .been tempted to
extend their terms through constitutional reforms or challenges."148
When the judiciary fails to legally challenge and prevent the exercise of
such tactics, democracy and judicial independence suffer as a result.49
In many cases, the constitutional challenges and reforms are the result
of a president exercising his unilateral powers independent of the legisla-
ture including "decree powers, the ability to interpret and issue regula-
tions in order to implement a general law. . .and the right to initiate bills
and referendums."15 0 In an attempt to curb abuse of unilateral powers,
many legislatures limit the president, such as in Honduras where referen-
41. LAT-IN AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY 4 (Larry Diamond et al. eds.,
2008).
42. O'Toole, supra note 38, at 141.
43. Anibal Perez-Linan, Presidential Impeachment and the New Political Instability in
Latin America 51 (Margaret Levi et al. eds., 2007).
44. Id. at 186.
45. Schulz, supra note 32.
46. Id.
47. Jose S. Sorzano, Honduras is Right About Zelaya, 65(24) Hum. EVENTS, July 13,
2009, available at http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=32589.
48. O'ToOLE, supra note 38, at 125.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 159.
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dums require congressional approval. Ironically, it is when the legisla-
tures try to weaken the powers of the executive that presidents feel
threatened and employ unilateral powers to defend their position and
policies.5 '
D. No REELECTION: A CONSTITUTIONAL SAFEGUARD
As democracy began to reemerge in Latin America in the 1980s, in an
effort to combat the historical issues of military dictatorship and authori-
tarian rule, legislatures often adopted the principle of "no reelection"
with the intention of limiting "the advantages of presidential incumbency
in countries where other forms of political accountability were weak."152
The severity of the "no reelection" concept varies because "some coun-
tries allow no immediate reelection, some allow immediate reelection but
limit the presidency to two terms, and some allow candidates to stand
again after a hiatus of one or two terms."153 Honduras seems to embrace
the strictest form by prohibiting reelection.54 Despite criticism of the
principle of no reelection centering on the fact that true democracies "de-
mand that voters be allowed to vote for whomever they choose" the con-
cept has prevailed in the region because it "does seem to keep power
limited in time."155 In Honduras, Mr. Zelaya's liberal push to seek "politi-
cal and social transformation" against the conservative Honduran legisla-
ture followed the traditional regional "pattern of an incumbent president
calling for a new constitution to strengthen the power of the presidency
and permit a second term (or more)."156
E. THE IMPEACHMENT POWER
In an effort to combat the overbearing executive and the trend of polit-
ical instability, most government systems in Latin America have em-
braced the constitutional procedure of impeachment to remove the
president from office. 57 And "an impeachment is intended not to be a
criminal trial but a political procedure allowing the Senate to remove the
president from office in response to accusations of treason, bribery, or
other 'high crimes and misdemeanors."' 58
Latin American nations are exercising the process of impeachment
with increasing frequency, which suggests that either "impeachments
have simply displaced coups as the new model of regime change," or al-
ternatively, that in a region traditionally unconcerned with the exercise of
51. Id. at 178.
52. Editorial, Honduras Crisis Reflects Regional Battle, BBC NEWS, July 21, 2009,
av'ailable at http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/americas/8 159932.stm.
53. O'Toole, supra note 38, at 158.
54. See CoNSTITUCIoN, supra note 6, art. 239.
55. PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS 23-24 (Thomas V. Diflacco
ed., 1977).
56. Honduras Crisis Reflects Regional Battle, supra note 52.
57. Perez-Linan, supra note 43, at 2-3.
58. Id. at 6-7.
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democratic due process "at the very least problematic presidents are
called to heel and replaced through institutional rather than extra-institu-
tional means."159 When presidential crises erupt and threaten political
stability and democracy,60 "in many cases a coup appears to be the only
means of getting rid of an incompetent or unpopular president."16'
Loosely defined, a "presidential crisis" usually occurs where "the chief
executive threatens to dissolve Congress or supports a constitutional re-
form having that purpose, attempts a military coup against Congress, or
'suspends' the term of the legislature until the next election."162 Many
legislatures concerned with combating such crises embrace some form of
constitutional removal power including: "[a] conventional impeach-
ment. . .; an alternative model in which Congress authorizes a trial per-
formed by the Supreme Court; a declaration of mental, physical, or moral
incapacity of the chief executive; and even some rare quasi-parliamentary
procedures."163
There is flexibility as to the specific method a nation may adopt so long
as it is prescribed constitutionally because "the removal of the chief exec-
utive within the limits of constitutional law preserves the integrity of the
regime."164 One popular model, similar to that employed in Honduras, is
the judicial model in which the president is tried by the judiciary rather
than legislature. 65 This model specifies, "the judiciary cannot rule on the
case against the president unless Congress authorizes the trial" and that
"the trial must be conducted by the Supreme Court and not by an ordi-
nary court."166 Thbis emphasizes the fact that "although Congress is not
always the only player involved in the decision to remove the president
from office, legislators always play a critical role in authorizing the
trial."167
IV. REGIONAL INSTANCES OF PRESIDENTIAL REMOVAL
Unlike the United States, where impeachment has been employed only
a handful of times, in Latin America beginning in the early 1990s congres-
sional impeachment proceedings began to gain traction as a favored
method for removing corrupt or economically failed presidencies, starting
with Fernando Collor de Mello in Brazil in 1992. Collor assumed the
presidency in 1990 following the departure of Jose Samey, who left an
office mired in corruption and mismanagement. 68 But it was only a short
59. LATIN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, supra note 33, at 113.
60. O'Toole, supra note 38, at 161.
61. PRESIDENTIALISM AND DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA 30 (Scott Mainwaring &
Matthew Soberg Shugart eds., 1997).
62. Perez-Linan, supra note 43, at 44.
63. Id. at 58.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 135.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 139.
68. LATIN AMERICA, ITS PROBLEMS AND ITS PROMISE: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY INTRO-
Duc~iION 486 (Jan Knippers Black ed., 1984) (2005).
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time until Collor faced his own charges of corruption and scandal after
executing failed economic policies and a congressional investigation led
to the discovery of Collor's offshore bank accounts containing millions of
dollars of corruption money.69 He was quickly impeached and suspended
by the Chamber of Deputies, and resigned three months later when the
Senate authorized his prosecution. 70
A year later in Venezuela, President Carlos Andres Perez was also im-
peached on corruption charges amidst a major economic crisis.7' Then, in
1996 in Columbia, President Ernesto Samper, accused of receiving cam-
paign funds from drug cartels, proposed resolving the situation either
through a referendum or through early elections.72 While his opponents
criticized allowing any solutions not embodied in their constitution,
Samper was fortunate enough for his party to rally behind him and
avoided impeachment when Congress agreed to acquit him of charges.73
The Congress in Ecuador employed a different tactic that same year
when it removed President Abdala Bucaram on after charging him with
"4mental incapacity."174 Bucaram had the unfortunate luck of being the
president whose party was the minority in Congress and thus unable to
combat accusations of corruption and failure in the face of an economic
crisis.75
Economic issues and political corruption were not the only motivators
for impeachment and presidential removal in Latin America. In Para-
guay in 1999, President Raul Cubas Grau, shortly after taking office, at-
tempted to pardon the former head of his party, General Lino Oviedo,
whom the former president had arrested and charged with sedition.76
Unable to pardon Oviedo, Cubas instead commuted his sentence and
Oviedo was released soon thereafter.77 The Supreme Court, at Con-
gress's direction, determined Cubas had acted unconstitutionally and or-
dered him to recapture Oviedo or face impeachment. 78 Following violent
riots outside the Congress building calling for Cubas's resignation, and
foreseeing defeat in the Senate, he chose to resign. 79
After being reelected in 1995, Alberto Fujimori of Peru began to seek a
constitutional reformation that would allow him to run for another term
(as Zelaya was accused of doing prior to his removal).8 0 But Fujimori
69. Id. at 487.
70. Id.
71. MONA M. LYNE, THE VOTER'S DILEMMA AND DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY:
LATIN AMERICA AND BEYOND 225 (2008).
72. CHECKING EXECUTIVE POWER: PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT IN COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE 72 (Jody C. Baumgartner & Naoko Kada eds., 2003).
73. Id. at 73.
74. LATIN AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY, supra note 41, at 6.
75. Id.
76. Paraguay EUROPA WORLD YEAR BOOK 2004, VOL. 2 3368 (Joanne Maher et al.
eds., 2004).
77. Id. at 3369.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. LATIN AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY, supra note 41, at 8.
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never reached a third term because in 2000, after facing criminal charges
and accusations of rigging the vote, he chose to resign rather than suffer
impeachment. 8' Most recently, Alfredo Palacio of Ecuador narrowly
avoided impeachment in 2005 after taking steps similar to Zelaya in at-
tempting "to call a referendum on re-writing the constitution without go-
ing through the legislature."182 The Congress condemned his actions and
claimed it would seek impeachment if he continued with his designs. 83
These cases exemplify the fact that a president need not go so far as to
commit corruption or institute poor economic policies to be removed
from office; simply acting contrary to Congress or the Courts could lead
to removal.
V. WAS ZELAYA DEMOCRATICALLY REMOVED?
A. THE HONDURAN CONSTITUTION
In 1982, Honduras adopted a new democratic constitution after years
of military rule, which included 379 articles, seven of which could not be
repealed or amended, including a prohibition on reelection of the presi-
dent.8 4 While the Honduran Constitution can be amended much like the
Constitution of the United States, "no amendment can ever change..
the rules that limit a president to a single four-year term."8 15 Aside from
limiting reelection, however, the Honduran Constitution does not clearly
establish procedures regarding impeachment. 86 Most Latin American
constitutions provide for impeachment "only if the president is alleged to
be guilty of serious common crimes, abuses of authority or violations of
the constitution or the law."187 The Honduran Constitution is largely "un-
clear about the impeachment process once charges are brought by a sim-
ple majority in the national assembly."88 And as mentioned above, the
power for the president to call a referendum is severely limited in Hondu-
ras because "the power to convoke a referendum .. .can be. .. .used by
presidents to apply pressure on legislators to go along with their policy
proposals, and to reaffirm their popular mandate and legitimacy."839
B. SUPPORTERS CLAIM THE REMOVAL WAS DEMOCRATIC
Supporters of the action taken by the de facto regime argued that by
seeking a public opinion poll, Mr. Zelaya clearly violated the "unchange-
81. Id.
82. O'TooLE, supra note 38, at 164.
83. Id.
84. Octavio Sanchez, A 'Coup' in Honduras? Nonsense, CHRISTIAN SCi. MONITOR,
July 2, 2009, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2009/0702/p09sO3-coop.html.
85. Miguel A. Estrada, Ouster of Zelaya Was a Legal Act, MIAMI HERALD, July 10,
2009.
86. Op-Ed, Lousy President, Terrible Precedent, ECONOMIST, July 2, 2009, available at
http://www.economist.com/opinion/PrinterFriendly.cfm?story-id=3944740.
87. J. Mark Payne et al., DEMOCRACIES IN DEVELOPMENT: POLITICS AND REFORM IN
LATIN AMERICA 100 (2007).
88. Id. at 101.
89. Id. at 92.
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able articles of the Constitution that deal with the prohibition of re-
electing a president and of extending his term." 90 According to Article
239 of the Honduran Constitution:
[N]o citizen who has already served as head of the Executive Branch
can be President or Vice-President. Whoever violates this law or pro-
poses its reform [emphasis added], as well as those that support such
violation directly or indirectly, will immediately cease in their func-
tions and will be unable to hold any public office for a period of 10
years.91
Under a strict, narrow reading and application of the constitution, by
simply proposing reform of the constitutional "no reelection" provision,
Mr. Zelaya automatically removed himself from office without requiring
any further proceedings. The fact that the military took action in forcing
him out of office was merely part of its duties "under Article 272. . .[to]
enforce compliance with the Constitution, particularly with respect to
presidential succession." 92 Furthermore, supporters have argued that
under their understanding and interpretation of constitutional limits, if
they did not act to remove Mr. Zelaya, "Article 375 would hold them
legally liable for failing to oppose Zelaya's crimes." 9 3
C. THE COUP IS A THREAT TO TRUE DEMOCRACY IN HONDURAS
While the words of the Honduran Constitution are clear, the lack of
procedure surrounding execution of Article 239 prohibitions is troubling,
especially considering the general provisions for and successful use of
presidential impeachment in many other countries of the region. Ar-
mando Sarmiento, former head of the tax service, commented on Mr.
Zelaya's removal stating, "Every citizen has the right to a fair trial and to
defend themselves but he was not given that right. He was just thrown
out of his homeland." 94 Opponents of the actions in Honduras have ar-
gued that Mr. Zelaya did not even propose a true referendum, which
would have been prohibited, but merely a survey of public opinion on
whether a referendum should be proposed.9 5 Assuming that Mr. Zelaya
did in fact violate the constitution, "the Congress should have followed
legal procedures to impeach him, rather than for the army pulling him out
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92. Miguel A. Estrada, supra note 85.
93. Editorial, Cuba Si, Honduras No? What the White House isn't doing to bolster
democracy in Latin America, THE Gov'T MONITOR, Sept. 13, 2009, available at
http://thegovmonitor.com/world-news/unitedstates/cuba-si-honduras-no-what-
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of bed and spiriting him out of the country in the dead of night."196
The Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of the constitution, and
claim that Mr. Zelaya automatically lost his status as president, effectively
denied him the privileges of a high official "under Article 416 of the Hon-
duras penal code, [under which] he would have been arraigned, tried and
sentenced by magistrates drawn from the court itself, with ample protec-
tion for his various special legal rights."197 By failing to exercise a demo-
cratic procedure for removing Mr. Zelaya, the de facto Honduran
government's actions constituted an "insult to decades of Latin America's
hard-won, historic struggle with democracy." 98 Furthermore, "[iln a soci-
ety based on Rule of Law, there are various mechanisms available for an
opposition to make claims against a sitting administration "99 including
the process of impeachment, as discussed in detail above, which would
have been an obvious option in the Honduran situation.
VI. CONCLUSION
Democracy in Latin America has drastically improved over the past
three decades despite fitful controversies and ideological shifts. While far
from perfect, regional constitutions and governments organized around
supporting the principles of the rule of law and dedication to procedures
promises that democracy will continue to flourish and drive out corrup-
tion and manipulation. But the recent events in Honduras surrounding
the unceremonious removal of President Zelaya are a disturbing setback
and signal that, "despite moves to greater levels of democracy in the
hemisphere, many of the freely elected governments continue to face se-
rious threats from forces which promote their removal by non-constitu-
tional means."' 00 While the Honduran Constitution makes clear that Mr.
Zelaya's actions may have been prohibited and justified his rem6val from
office, the lack of due process afforded the ousted president is a troubling
sign of a weak and inflexible judiciary propped up by a shortsighted legis-
lature. Regardless of the fact that the Honduran government has re-
cently moved on with the inauguration of a new president, the people
might still want to press the legislature to preserve their rights and the
future of democracy in the country by amending the constitution regard-
ing procedures for presidential removal. If the highest executive in the
land cannot receive fair procedures and rights under the legal system,
what guarantees can the common man expect?
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